Introduction
The major portion of Superblock transuranic (TRU) waste is glove-box trash contaminated with weapons grade plutonium. This waste originates in the Building 332 (B332) radioactive-materials area (RMA). Because each plutonium batch brought into the B332 RMA is well characterized with regard to nature and quantity of transuranic nuclides present, waste also will be well characterized without further analytical work, provided the batches are quite similar. A sample data set was created by examining the 41 incoming samples analyzed by Ken Raschke (using a γ-ray spectrometer) for isotopic distribution and by Ted Midtaune (using a calorimeter) for mass of radionuclides. The 41 samples were from separate batches analyzed May 1993 through January 1997. All available weapons grade plutonium data in Midtaune's files were used. Alloys having greater than 50% transuranic material were included. The intention of this study is to use this sample data set to judge "similarity."
The database represents a random, but incomplete, set of the weapons grade plutonium sample population in the Superblock. It includes 91% of the material received in 1996 and approximately 60% of the 1995 material. The proportion of material from earlier years is unspecified, but is certainly greater than 50%. The data set is in excess of the 5% of total needed for a sound statistical treatment. It should be sufficient to answer the following questions: ♦ Does the average isotopic composition match that assumed by Hazardous Waste Management (HWM) Division for weapons grade plutonium? ♦ Do sample isotopic fractions disperse as narrow frequency distributions that justify use of an average isotopic composition? ♦ How much of the sample variation results from composition difference and how much from analytical uncertainty? ♦ Can compliance goals-expressed in terms of α-activity-be met with only a partial analysis of the radionuclides in the waste? ♦ Does the batch (date of manufacture) of plutonium have a significant effect on a waste's radioactive properties, or are other factors of greater importance? ♦ When alloyed with nontransuranic metals, does weapons grade plutonium have the same isotopic composition by γ-ray spectrometer analysis?
A segmented gamma scanner (SGS) will be used to analyze TRU waste drums. The SGS procedure differs from the more accurate analytical spectrometer method used to obtain the data here. Calorimetry is not available to the SGS for the determination of radionuclide mass. Error in the SGS procedure is dominated by difficulties in matching the sample matrix of calibration standards to that of heterogeneous waste having considerable drum-to-drum variability. The resulting systematic bias in the mass measurement (mass of a plutonium isotope-generally the major one, Pu-239-that produces a given gamma ray emission intensity) limits analysis accuracy. In light of the uncertainties in mass measurement, the data analysis that follows shows that weapons grade plutonium has a sufficiently consistent composition that analyzing for all the radionuclides known or suspected to be present does not improve the accuracy of alpha activity. Thus, one isotope can be measured and average ratios applied. As a result, one can avoid analyzing waste drums for the total set of radionuclides when generator knowledge attests to weapons grade plutonium as the only TRU material present. Furthermore, this data analysis provides a documentation of generator knowledge that the WIPP QAPP, Section 4, demands.
Sample Population, Averages, and Standard Deviations
Appendix I contains the complete data set. Plutonium isotope weights sum to 1 for each analyzed sample. Other radionuclides are given as weight fractions relative to plutonium (Pu) summing to 1. Figure 1a shows the complete distribution of Pu-239 values. Figure 1b is a blowup of the range of interest-the range near the average. The two figures differ in the cuts taken ( Figure 1a slices started at 0.9310±0.0004; Figure 1b , at 0.9350±0.0003), so they look a bit different. Nevertheless, there is a nearly Gaussian frequency distribution-about as Gaussian as expected for a sample set of this sizeprovided a single outlier is excluded. The outlier proves to be a purified Pu-239 sample (Pu-239 as a fraction of total Pu: 0.9771, rather than 0.9385) and may not, in fact, be correctly called "weapons grade." A statistical test, assuming a normal population distribution, indicates that the chance this batch belongs to the set of weapons grade samples, as defined by the rest of the group, is less than 1 in 10 200 .
Averages, with and without outlier, along with standard deviations were calculated and are shown in Table 1 . Weighted averages are also given. The mass of plutonium in each batch was used as the weighting factor. Rejecting the outlier changes the average and improves the standard deviation, but weighted and unweighted averages are essentially the same. Note that, while the raw data required plutonium isotopes to sum to 1 (see the Appendix I summary for averages in this format), the total of radionuclides is made to equal 1 in Table 1 and henceforth.
UCRL-ID-127458 3 For data with outlier excluded, the major radionuclide, Pu-239, has a very narrow relative standard deviation (1σ = 0.12%). Small scatter is consistent with a narrow Gaussian distribution (see Figure 1) 
Composition Variation versus Analysis Precision
The observed scatter may result from analytical imprecision, from real differences in the composition of weapons grade Pu, or from both. Table 2 shows data scatter as compared to the claimed analysis error and to experimental precision. Data scatter is expressed as one standard deviation for that set of samples with outlier omitted. Analysis error includes the gamma spectrometer counting error-essentially, the observed emission curve (gamma rays detected per unit time versus energy) as compared to the theoretical-and inaccuracy in the total radionuclide weight as determined by calorimetry. In this case, the sample set was only the 27 most recent analyses. Prior to October 1994, analytical results came without error bars. The precision estimate comes from 64 analyses of two weapons grade Pu validation standards that were run in 1996. The procedure tests the gamma spectrometer (γS) but does not speak to matrix effects, sampling errors, or errors associated with calorimetry. The conservative error assessment in Table 2 suggests that variables inherent in the analytical data are comparable with sample variation for the major isotope, Pu-239. Scatter due to a variation in composition is evident for minor components. At trace levels, signal-to-noise (detection limit) and interferences from major component emissions (tailing and perhaps secondorder emission peaks) make determination of an analysis error difficult. No Np-237 precision/accuracy is estimated; the Pu-242 error bar is said to be ±10% by default. Analysis of minor components-in particular, Am-241-may have some worth, but an average weapons grade Pu composition can be assumed with confidence.
With regard to sample variability, relative standard deviation increases as the isotopic fraction decreases for Pu-239, Pu-240, and Pu-242/Pu-238. Batch age at the time of analysis makes an important contribution to scatter for Pu-241. With a relatively short half life of 14.2 years, Pu-241 content gradually decreases. Batches were analyzed on receipt, and no direct specification of age was provided (i.e., analysis date and sample age are unrelated). There should be a corresponding increase in the daughters (Am-241 and Np-237) as Pu-241 decays. Np-237 content is too close to the detection limit to give the good negative correlation with Pu-241 content that might be expected of a daughter (see Figure 2a) . Surprisingly, the negative correlation of Am-241 with Pu-241 is even poorer (see Figure 2b ). In fact, this daughter shows substantially more scatter than expected. A chemical as well as physical aspect to the purification process exists for extraneous nuclide impurities that the preparation process leaves in weapons grade Pu ( e.g., americium and neptunium). This adds another variable and further increases the standard deviation. Thus, the chemistry aspects of the separation process must dominate in the case of Am-241. Americium content is small, but quite scattered, most likely reflecting the varying extent of chemical removal.
Correlations that Fix Nuclide Content
For a purely physical purification process, the amount of a residual impurity can be proportional to how closely its physical characteristic matches that of the desired material. In the rare case where secondary effects are inconsequential and no large concentration differences exist, one expects a normal distribution around the desired property-provided a good quantitative measure of the physical property is available. Because normal distributions are exponential in each direction, any impurity's concentration should drop away exponentially as its property becomes less like the material in question. Mass is the key physical property for separation of Pu-239. As Figure 3a shows, those long-lived Pu isotopes (with mass greater than 239 amu) plot linearly with mass on an exponential scale. Data from all samples analyzed since June 1996, are included in the Figure 3a plot, along with the average line (the unweighted 40-sample average with outlier omitted). If x is isotopic mass and [Pu-x] is concentration of a plutonium isotope of mass x expressed as weight fraction of plutonium, the following expression applies:
(1)
Corresponding semi-log plots of average data and of the outlier data are also shown (see Figure 3b ). Isotopic fractions as calculated from the average plot are included in Table 1 (see "Calculated from Eq. (1)"). Because only three points (Pu-239, Pu-240, and Pu-242) can be used to obtain the best fit line, the rather large scatter associated with the Pu-242 data limits the practical use of this curve. However, expression (1) provides a means of testing raw data quality. Any line having a very different slope or intercept cannot have resulted from analysis of only weapons grade Pu. Another grade of Pu or weapons grade material contaminated with a Pu isotope or isotope mixture will not lie on the Figure 3a -b curve. Outlier data provide an example.
Plutonium isotopic fractions from the γ-ray spectrometer by decree sum to 1. If isotopic impurities in Pu-239 decrease rapidly with mass, as they do, then expressions such as the following should be good approximations: Figure 4 shows plots of these expressions for all raw data including the outlier. An excellent fit results. The constant defined by a best-fit line is given on each plot. Expressions (2) and (3) can serve as limited tests of the SGS or gamma spectrometer's output. They provide a calibration check and an alternative means of determining Pu-241. Because Pu isotopic fractions are forced to equal 1, such expressions are not totally independent of the good data averages of Table 1 ; yet they are an additional method of judging the uniform consistency of the sample set. A single point might be expected if compositional variation and analytical error were absent. Expression (3) and Figure 4b indicate some sample variability. However, the artificial constraint that Pu isotopes must sum to 1 skews the data and obviates a defensible conclusion with regard to compositional variation versus analytical error as the source of scatter.
Meeting disposal requirements
The WIPP QAPP, Rev. 2, asks for measurement of waste radionuclide contents with precision and accuracy demands specified in terms of α-activity. Total alpha-activity is stated in alpha curies per gram of the weapons grade Pu sample and defined as follows:
where, a through f are specific α-activities of each nuclide.
The QAPP allows omission of those nuclides with half lives less than 20 years, specifically Pu-241, from the calculation, if desired. Given the large proportion of Pu-239 in weapons grade material, this particular radionuclide dominates the calculation of total α-activity per gram. Pu-239 content is, however, purposely the most accurately measured value. Appendix II provides input data, physical constants, and an example calculation of α − activity per gram sample. In general, determination of α-activity and related properties such as Pu-239 fissile gram equivalents, effective power, and thermal power are very precise and accurate. The analytical laboratory's γ-ray spectrometer validation sample serves as an "effective power" standard (certified as 2.450 mW/g ±0.05%); multiple in-house analyses during 1996 gave 2.444 mW/g ±0.08%. Table 3 shows α-activities calculated from the sample data set. The α-activity of weapons grade plutonium having the composition historically assumed by HWM for this material is 0.0812 αCi/g (see Table 1 , and note that this composition was assumed for the Appendix II calculations). It is, in fact, difficult to argue that the HWM-assumed composition is identical to the average calculated here; isotopic fractions are near the extreme for several minor radionuclides (see Table 1 ). Nevertheless, the assumed composition is satisfactory, given that α-activity agrees to within 1%. Furthermore, α-activity per gram of sample calculated from the data set average, 0.0805 αCi/g, compares well with total α-activities calculated from other data and data set averages of Table 1 , as well as from those samples with the highest or lowest percentage of each radionuclide. Only alpha-activities of unique samples (first encounter) are recorded in Table 3 . A blank appears where otherwise a calculation of α-activity would have been repeated. Note that, as expected from expression (2), the extreme high Pu − 239 isotopic fraction is from the sample with the extreme low Pu-240 isotopic fraction (and vise versa).
Because a very accurately determined Pu-239 content dominates the α-activity calculation, scatter is quite small (93%-112% of the average value, even at the extremes). Remarkably, the outlier also has a satisfactory α-activity (85% of the average value) well within the narrowest accuracy limits (75%-125%) allowed by the TRU waste QAPP. The Np-237 high extreme seems to be another outlier (see Figure 3a) , but it also causes no problems. Np-237 was below the minimum detectable limit in several batches, so no activity has been calculated for Np ∼ 237 at the low extreme. 
Conclusions
Based on this data set, weapons grade Pu is a material of uniform consistency for the purposes of waste characterization. Figure 5 shows that no significant systematic change has taken place in the composition during the time period of this data set (May 1993 through January 1997). Dispersion is large relative to any content variation with analysis date. Trends in the data can be expressed as the change in isotopic fraction per day. For isotopes of interest, the change is as follows: Pu-239, -0.00000001/day; Pu-240, 0.00000017/day; Pu-241, -0.00000016/day, and Am-241, 0.00000005/day. Figure 5 best-fit lines are essentially flat; clearly, trends are totally insignificant relative to data scatter.
Furthermore, the composition historically assumed by HWM is satisfactory, although the average composition determined here may be somewhat superior. Analytical data used as a check on generator knowledge would not need to meet the rigid quality-assurance/quality-control standards required of analyses.
Alloys of weapons grade Pu with other metals (not TRU) are common to the data set evaluated (see Appendix I) and have no effect. Generators are asked to note the presence of elements that the SGS fails to detect or that it analyzes poorly (e.g., uranium-present in a few samples at about the 5% level). Material containing minor amounts of even such exotic, extraneous nontransuranic metals can be accepted as weapons grade Pu for our purposes. All conclusions stated here can be shown to apply to such alloys. Finally, the methodology applied here might be used equally well to show the uniformity of Pu-238 in the Superblock or of fuel-grade Pu. Average compositions for these materials could be defined, documented, and used similarly. Sample No. 1 2(95%) 3(82%) 4(5% U) 5 6 7 8 9 Anal. Date 5 / 1 1 / 9 3 1 1 / 9 / 9 3 1 1 / 1 9 / 9 3 1 1 / 2 2 / 9 3 1 2 / 1 7 / 9 3 1 / 1 1 / 9 4 1 / 2 1 / 9 4 2 / 3 / 9 4 5 / 2 7 / 9 4 Weight, g 2348. In the case of alloys, percent transuranic nuclides (or percent uranium) is indicated parenthetically next to the sample number Sample No. 10(82%) 11(82%) 1 2 1 3 14(63%) 15(55%) 16(63%) 1 7 18(78%) Anal. Date 6 / 9 / 9 4 6 / 1 0 / 9 4 6 / 1 5 / 9 4 1 0 / 2 4 / 9 4 3 / 7 / 9 5 3 / 6 / 9 5 3 / 8 / 9 5 7 / 2 5 / 9 5 8 / 1 / 9 5 Weight, g 1356 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 5 2 6 2 7 Anal. Date 8 / 2 1 / 9 5 8 / 2 3 / 9 5 8 / 2 2 / 9 5 8 / 2 4 / 9 5 8 / 3 1 / 9 5 8 / 2 1 / 9 5 9 / 2 6 / 9 5 9 / 2 4 / 9 6 9 / 2 5 / 9 6 Weight, g 2089 6 / 1 5 / 9 6 6 / 2 8 / 9 6 6 / 2 9 / 9 6 6 / 2 7 / 9 6 9 / 2 7 / 9 6 1 0 / 3 / 9 6 1 0 / 8 / 9 6 1 0 / 1 0 / 9 6 1 0 / 2 5 / 9 6 Weight, g 2231 Then the total specific power of a particular item at time t can be found as 
Abbreviations and Acronyms

B332
SP t SP f t SP f t SP f t SP f t SP f t SP f t total
The element weight of Pu in the item at a time t can be calculated as the ratio of the power of the item as measured by calorimetry to the specific power of the item as calculated by equation (4) 
where W is the power of the item in milliWatts at time t, and the specific power has been decay corrected to the calorimetry date t. The resulting element weight is in grams.
The isotope weight of a weapons grade Pu item at a time t is defined to be the mass of Pu isotopes 239 
where t is the time of the calorimetry measurement and the weight is in units of grams.
Likewise, the weight of any isotope of interest (in grams) can found by multiplying the element weight m element by the appropriate isotope fraction. Therefore the weights of 238 The enrichment of a weapons grade Pu item at a time t is defined to be the percentage of 240 Pu in the item so the enrichment is simply enrichment = 100f 240 (t) . The enrichment of items classified as primarily 238 Pu at time t is defined to be the percentage of 238 Pu in the item and so enrichment = 100f 238 (t) . Likewise, the enrichment of items classified as primarily 242 Pu at time t is defined to be the percentage of 242 Pu in the item and so enrichment = 100f 242 . (t) 
